This paper examines the empirical validity of the prediction that if governments minimize the deadweight loss from raising revenue through inflation and tax finance, there should be a positive contemporaneous association between inflation and the level of tax burdens. We examine the empirical validity of this prediction using data from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
A government can satisfy its budget constraint either by printing money or by levying taxes. Each method of finance has efficiency costs. Higher inflation rates may adversely affect the economy's transaction mechanism and lead to inefficiencies in contracting. Higher taxes may distort labor supply, saving, and investment decisions. Numerous authors have examined the optimal inflation rate in the presence of tax finance, describing the behavior of governments concerned only with minimizing the deadweight burden of raising a given revenue, whether these prescriptions are consistent with actual government behavior is an unresolved and relatively unstudied issue. Mankiw (1987) reports a striking positive correlation between tax burdens and inflation rates in the postwar United States, a finding consistent with the predictions of these optimizing government models . This paper extends previous work on the interaction between taxes and inflation. We present new empirical evidence on the correlation between inflation and tax rates in a sample of OECD countries, and conclude that optimizing models with time-invariant tastes cannot explain the observed correla-2 tions in most countries.
This means that other considerations must be important determinants of inflation rates. One possibility is that governments choose inflation and tax rates based on stabilization objectives. Alternatively, the government's dislike for inflation may vary over time for political or other reasons.
We discuss these issues in the conclusion.
Models with and without commitment imply a positive relationship between the inflation rate and tax rates. In both cases, the marginal social cost of raising additional revenue with the inflation tax is an increasing function of the inflation rate. The marginal deadweight burden of tax finance also rises with the tax rate.
An optimizing government which equates the marginal social costs of obtaining revenue from inflation and taxation will therefore raise both the against the class of optimizing models studied below, it might nevertheless be possible to reconcile the speeches of policy-makers with the optimizing government models. When government spending is high, governments tend to raise taxes and also to increase debt finance. Central bankers who react by purchasing government bonds with newly minted money, thereby raising seigniorage revenues, may rationalize this behavior with fear of high interest rates generated by large 3 government debt stocks. Their behavior may however be consistent with the predictions of positive models of government based on deadweight burden minimization.
Our analysis of inflation and taxation is divided into three sections. The first summarizes the links between inflation and tax policy, first when the government is able to commit, and then when it is not. Section two studies the empirical relationship between taxes and inflation in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany and France. We show that a positive association between inflation and the level of tax burdens obtains only in the U.S. and Japanese data. The conclusion discusses why simple positive models of government behavior such as those analyzed here may be incapable of explaining monetary and fiscal policy.
1.
Inflation and Taxation
This section models an optimizing government's choice of inflation and tax periods. We first consider the empirical counterpart of equation (4), which is valid with commitment. Mankiw (1987) estimates an equation similar to this on post-war U.S. data. We also estimate the empirical counterpart of (6), the first order condition that holds without commitment. The first four rows of Table 2 report country-by-country estimates of equation (4) . These estimates ignore the information about inflation rates in one country that may be contained in the coincident experience of other nations.
To remedy this problem, we also estimated the equations for the post-war period in all countries using the seemingly unrelated regression technique. The resulting estimates are shown in Table 3 , and are quite similar to the countryby-country findings in Table 2 . The last row of Since the earlier results suggest that differencing and autoregressive corrections with time trends yield similar results, we present only the latter. 
Conclusions
The view that governments use both taxes and inflation to raise revenue while attempting to minimize total deadweight loss cannot explain our finding that higher taxes are just as often associated with lower as with higher inflation.
The positive association between inflation and tax rates in U.S. time series data which has been cited as support for the optimizing government model of monetary and fiscal policy does not recur in other nations.
Several explanations may be advanced to account for our results. One is that governments are unable to adjust the structure of taxes frequently enough to enforce the first order conditions implied by optimizing models. This view is implicit in the work of Feldstein (1983) and others who view the effects of inflation on tax burdens as largely accidental and unanticipated. Even when tax rules are costly to change, however, policy makers could implement the links between taxes and inflation described above. An unindexed tax system which raises corporate tax burdens during inflationary periods because depreciation is based on historic cost, for example, generates a positive association between tax rates and inflation.
A second possibility, which we regard as more promising, is that the government's objective function which guides inflation and tax policy varies over time. Previous studies include Phelps (1973 ( ), Calvo (1978 , Drazen (1979), Helpman and Sadka (1979) , Kimbrough (1986) , Lucas (1986) , and Romer (1987).
2.
Roubini and Sachs (1988) have independently tested the predictions of the optimizing government models with respect to inflation and tax rates. They study a sample of fifteen OECD countries for the period since 1960, and find virtually no support for these models outside the United States.
3.
Our analysis only applies if the central government and the central bank are actually cooperating. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) present a model in which these arms of government behave noncooperatively.
4.
Because we consider relatively many effects of inflation, there is no presumption, as in the more narrow models of Kimbrough (1986) or Faig (1987) , that the optimal tax rate on money is given by the Friedman rule. This presumption actually disappears as soon as money services are not viewed as perfect substitutes for other arguments in the utility function (see Romer (1987) ).
5.
Real money balances could also depend on income and taxes without altering our substantive conclusions, although for simplicity we ignore these effects through most of our analysis.
6.
Inflation in period t+1 is defined as the change in the price level between t and t+1.
7.
The structure of this model resembles that of Barro and Gordon (1983) , although they do not consider the revenue created by inflation. If the government responds with a monetary expansion accompanied by a tax cut, the ratio of taxes to GNP will be unambiguously lower than without the shock and associated stabilization. Inflation will also be lower, unless the stabilization policy more than offsets the disturbance it was designed to correct. Lib-26-67
